Trend and Contestation of Religious Discourse Post "Perppu Ormas" at Islamic College Jambi

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Abstract

Government Regulation instead of Law (Perppu) for Ormas No. 2 of 2017 has shown its implications for religious activities and discourses at IAIN Kerinci and UIN Sultan Thaha Saifuddin Jambi. The argument of this research departs from the tendency of campus elements to strengthen identity through discourse contestation after the issuance of the Perppu Ormas. This study applies a descriptive qualitative approach through observation, interviews, and document review. This study found that Perppu Ormas No. 2 of 2017 raises two different attitudes at the level of student organizations. Acceptance of the Perppu Ormas argues intending to deradicalize and strengthen moderation. Meanwhile, the voices of refusal argued that the Perppu Ormas have the potential to weaken democracy and be misused. Perppu Ormas at the leadership level was welcomed by intensifying the discourse on religious moderation and strengthening the Pancasila ideology through seminars and study centers.

[Perppu Ormas No. 2 Tahun 2017 telah menunjukkan implikasinya terhadap aktivitas dan wacana keagamaan di IAIN Kerinci dan UIN STS Jambi. Argumen penelitian ini berangkat dari kecenderungan elemen-elemen kampus untuk meneguhkan identitas melalui kontestasi wacana pasca penerbitan Perppu Ormas. Penelitian ini menerapkan pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif, melalui observasi, wawancara, dan telaah dokumen. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa Perppu Ormas No. 2 Tahun 2017 menimbulkan dua sikap yang berbeda di tataran organisasi kemahasiswaan. Penerimaan terhadap Perppu Ormas berargumen dengan tujuan deradikalisasi dan meneguhkan moderasi. Sedangkan suara penolakan berargumen bahwa Perppu Ormas berpotensi melemahkan demokrasi dan disalahgunakan. Perppu Ormas pada tataran pimpinan disambut dengan mengintensifkan wacana moderasi beragama dan penguatan ideologi Pancasila melalui seminar maupun pusat studi].

Keywords: contestation; religious discourse; Perppu Ormas; Islamic campus

Introduction

The dynamics of the political constellation at the national level in recent years have opened up more space for mainstreaming Islamism and are marked by the existence of co-optation efforts of religion in the name of power-politics that are so massive in the public sphere. The

intersection of power relations has implications for the construction of religious discourse.[1]

The articulation of religious discourse in the public sphere is mainly driven by religious and political activists (neo-fundamentalists) with a strong base on campus and urban professionals.[2] The orientation and strategy of the group are to influence society through social action by rearranging the discourse of Islamization at the lower levels of society.[3] The actors have indirectly overtaken the religious authority that the charismatic clerics have considered. The shift in religious actors also impacts religious discourse that revolves around nation-state and politics.

It has gradually attracted the public's enthusiasm and gave rise to a large enough mass wave. To a certain extent, it confidently began to show a confrontational attitude toward the state. Moreover, the construction of discourse formed as part of social action is more complex, which can spark interreligious disputes and sectarianism. It triggers the weakening of Indonesia's diverse national integrity.[4]

This situation gave rise to various responses and policies from the government that was oriented toward maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the nation. One of them is the issuance of the Perppu on Community Organizations no. 2 of 2017, which resulted in the revocation of the legal entity status of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) organization. The basis for the disbandment, as conveyed by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Wiranto, is that there are strong indications that HTI's activities have

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[1] Andréia Cristina Cipriani, "Power in Religious Discourse: A Discourse Analysis of Two Sermons from the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God" (Brasil: Universidade Federal De Santa Catarina, 2002), https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/bit stream/handle/.

[2] Muhammad Qasim Zaman. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[3] Eko Ariwidodo, "Shifting Paradigm of Modern Islam Fundamentalism as Islamized Space Autonomy in Indonesia," *Karsa: Journal of Social and Islamic Culture* 25, no.1 (June 2017): 249-283, http://ejournal.iainmadura.ac.id/index.php/karsa/article/view /1357.

[4] Iqbal Ahnaf, "Haruskah HTI Dibubarkan," CRCS UGM, last modified May 2017, https://crcs.ugm.ac.id/haruskah-hti-dibubarkan/

contradicted the objectives, principles, and characteristics based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as sparked friction and conflict in society that could threaten the security and sovereignty of the Indonesian state.[5]

HTI is at least an example for many religious organizations, in particular, to renegotiate the organization's direction with Pancasila and the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Religious organizations with a transnational-fundamentalist spirit are faced with the burden of aligning their aspirations and movements with Indonesian values and nationalism. However, Yon Machmudi's reading shows that in recent years, fundamentalist groups have tended to take a stand and move to a more moderate spectrum.[6]

Whether affiliated with the Salafis or the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin), fundamentalist movements have reached campus areas; even campuses cannot be denied as their ideological laboratories. The religious discourse developed is different from the religious discourse that develops in religious institutions in general.[7] Usually, as stated by Noorhaidi Hasan, their movements involve large masses and complex organizations. Islamic activism is woven by prioritizing emotional relationships in informal social networks, such as utilizing friendship, kinship, and collegial connections.[8]

The intensity of the movement involving emotional relationships has formed a network and an established ideology in the university environment. However, the issuance of the Perppu Ormas certainly has impacted the patterns and packaging strategies of religious

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[5] Kompas.com, "HTI Resmi Dibubarkan," last modified July 2017, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/07/19/hti-resmi-dibubarkan.

[6] Yon Machmudi. "The Future of Political Islam in Indonesia," International Conference on Political Values in Asia held in Bangkok, last modified December 2012, https://www.academia.edu/5355960/The_Future_of_Political_Islam_in_Indonesia.

[7] Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat* (Yogyakarta: Gading, 2015).

[8] Noorhaidi Hasan, "Book Review: Islam Politik, Gerakan Sosial, Pencarian Model Kajian Islam Baru Lintas Disiplin," *Al-Jamiah* 44, no. 1 (2006): 248. https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2006.441.241-250.

discourse that they have been carrying so far. The limitation of movement space requires them to choose a different way than before, which tends to be irregular, disorganized, hidden (hidden transcript), and individual.[9]

This issue has received little attention from researchers. Existing studies can be divided into two categories. First, research that focuses on the perspective of law and legislation (Mahdi, 2017[10]; Kurniawan, 2018[11]; Riadi, 2018[12]; Pambudi, 2019[13]; Pandanwangi, 2020[14]). Second, research linking Perppu Ormas No. 2 of 2017 with

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[9] James Scott, *Senjatanya Orang-Orang yang Kalah* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2000), 17.

[10] Imam Mahdi, "Pembubaran Ormas Radikal Dalam Perspektif Perundang-undangan: Kajian Khusus Perppu No. 02 Tahun 2017," *Jurnal Nuansa* 10, no. 2 (2017): 132-144, https://ejournal.iainbengkulu.ac.id/index.php/nuansa/article/view/648/558.

[11] M. Beni Kurniawan, "Konstitusionalitas Perppu Nomor 2 Tahun 2017 tentang Ormas Ditinjau dari UUD 1945," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 15, no. 3 (2018): 455-479, https://jurnalkonstitusi.mkri.id/index.php/jk/issue/view/49.

[12] Bagus Riadi, Diki Drajat, M. Zia Ulhaq, "Analisis Kebijakan Perppu Ormas: Kritik Terhadap Perppu Nomor 2 Tahun 2017," (2018):1-17, https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Diki-Drajat/publication/322202106_ANALISIS_KEBIJAKAN_PERPPU_ ORMAS_KRITIK_TERHADAP_PERPPU_NOMOR_2_TAHUN_2017/links/5a4b2 a72aca272d29464b874/ANALISIS-KEBIJAKAN-PERPPU-ORMAS-KRITIK-TERHADAP-PERPPU-NOMOR-2-TAHUN-2017.pdf.

[13] *Yogi Pambudi* and *Mirra Noor Milla,* "Potensi Penyalahgunaan Kekuasaan Pada Undang-Undang Organisasi Masyarakat Pasal 59 (4) Huruf C," *Deviance: Jurnal Kriminologi* 3, no. 1 (2019): 37-53, https://journal.budiluhur.ac.id/index.php/deviance /article/view/870.

[14] Prayudisti Shinta Pandanwangi, "Analisis Komparatif Perppu No. 17 Tahun 2017 dan UU No. 17 Tahun 2013 Tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan," *Arkhais: Jurnal Ilmu Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia* 11, no. 1 (2020): 1-14, http://journal.unj.ac.id/unj/ index.php/arkhais/article/view/14997/10994.

intolerant group activism and the development of radicalism (Burhani, 2017[15]; Hikam, 2018[16]; Rizki, 2018[17]; Kasih, 2020[18]).

This research focuses on the campus context in responding to Perppu Ormas No. 2 of 2017 and the struggles of religious discourse and its implications for academic and student activities. In particular, this research focuses on two Islamic universities: UIN Sultan Thaha Saifuddin (STS) and IAIN Kerinci. The selection of these universities was based on the presence and intensity of Islamic organizations, which were heterogeneous and developed quite massively there, such as KAMMI, LDK, PMII, HMI, and IMM. These Islamic organizations seem to produce and contest religious discourses actively.

In addition, the two Islamic universities in the Jambi region have also been noted in recent years to be very active in confirming and producing inclusive and moderate religious discourse. For example, IAIN Kerinci, together with the Padang Religious Education and Training Center in March, held training on religious moderation, as did UIN Jambi, which has several times recorded dissemination of Pancasila ideology and religious moderation. These activities are a form of response from campus residents to the development of radicalism and anti-system understanding, especially in the Jambi region. Several cases of radicalism and extremism have occurred in Jambi this decade:

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[15] Ahmad Najib Burhani, "The Banning of Hizbut Tahrir and the Consolidation of Democracy in Indonesia," *Yusof Ishak Institute*, no. 71 (September 2017): 1-10, https://www.academia.edu/34607037/The_Banning_of_Hizbut_Tahrir_and_the_Con solidation_of_Democracy_in_Indonesia.

[16] Muhammad AS Hikam dan Stanislaus Riyanta, "Perkembangan Kelompok Radikal di Indonesia Pasca Perppu Ormas Nomor 2 Tahun 2017 dan UU Nomor 5 Tahun 2018 Terorisme Dalam Perspektif Keamanan Nasional," *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara* 8, no 3 (2018): 47-68, https://jurnal.idu.ac.id/index.php/JPBH/article/view/439/289.

[17] Mochamad Faizal Rizki, "Deradikalisasi Pengikut Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Pasca Terbitnya Perppu No. 2 Tahun 2017 Tentang Ormas," *Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana* 3, no.1 (2018): 164-176, https://journal.unsika.ac.id/index.php/politikomindonesiana/article/view/1420.

[18] Nugraeni Mijil Anggoro Kasih, "Kontestasi Diskursus Penerapan Perpppu Ormas Oleh Kelompok Islam Moderat: Studi Kasus Nahdlatul Ulama dan Muhammadiyah," (Tesis, UGM, 2020), http://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/.

the shooting of 1 Tebo resident suspected of being a terrorist by Densus 88 and the installation of ISIS attributes in the Jambi Provincial Government office area,[19] show that campuses cannot ignore the problems around them.

Methods

This qualitative research relies heavily on information from objects or participants on a broad scope and general questions.[20] Qualitative research relies on the triangulation of data generated from three methods: interviews, observation, and document review. Observation is done by collecting research data through observation and sensing where the researcher is involved in the daily life of the informants. Interviews were conducted in a structured manner by setting problems and questions related to experience or behavior. The document review is done by collecting text data or documents relevant to the research problem. This research was conducted in 2 locations, UIN Sultan Thaha Saifudin and IAIN Kerinci. The data were obtained from stakeholders or campus leaders, students, student organization leaders, and lecturers.

The selection of informants is carried out purposively (not randomly), that is, based on what is known about the existing variations or elements. Purposive sampling was used because it assessed the informants based on the research aims. We use purposive sampling in this research; two people from each student organization (IMM, HMI, PMII, LDK, KAMMI) were asked the same question. Furthermore, informants from the lecturers were selected by three people who understood the issue. The campus leaders were chosen one each, the Rector of IAIN Kerinci and Vice-Rector III of UIN STS Jambi. The data was analyzed using several steps according to the theory of Miles,

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[19] Republika.co.id, "Kesbangpol Jambi Petakan Potensi Radikalisme," last February 2020, https://www.republika.co.id/berita/q5do8p459/kesbangpol-jambi-petakan-potensi-radikalisme.

[20] J.W. Creswell, *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research* (Singapore: Pearson Merrill Prentice Hall, 2008).

Huberman, and Saldana, namely analyzing the data in three steps: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification.[21]

Results

Islamic Campus, Religious Activities, and Perppu Ormas

Trends in religious discourse at IAIN Kerinci can be grouped into four major issues: Islam and nationality or state, jurisprudence studies, religious moderation, and the practice of hijrah. These religious discourses are generally discussed in internal and external forums. Internal forums are conducted with speech methods, discussions, regeneration, and mentoring. Meanwhile, external forums are in the form of public seminars involving various groups such as local officials, academics, practitioners, *da'wa*h activists, and religious leaders.

Student Organizations	Religious Discourse	Method
KAMMI	• Islamic Leadership • Jurisprudence studies • Hijrah discourse	• Speech method
IMM	• Deradicalization • Insights of Indonesia and nationality refer to the thoughts of Muhammadiyah leaders, for example, Syafii Maarif • Religious Moderation	• Public Seminar • Internal discussions • Regeneration

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[21] Miles, et al., *Qualitative Data Analysis, A Methods Sourcebook*, Edition 3 (USA: Sage Publications). Terj. Tjetjep Rohindi Rohidi (Jakarta: UI-Press, 2014).

HMI	• Indonesian Islam • Nationality and Community • Local Islamic Traditions	• Seminar • Internal Discussion
PMII	• Islam and Pancasila Ideology • Religious Tolerance • Islam and Nationality	• Public Seminar • Internal discussions • Regeneration
LDK	• Quran Literacy • Study of the *Fiqh Ibadah* • Hijrah, anti-dating	• Mentoring • Training

Table 1. Trends of Religious Discourse on Student Organizations (IAIN Kerinci)

Religious activities at IAIN Kerinci are mostly driven by student organizations, both internal and external campuses. Extra-campus organizations at IAIN Kerinci include HMI, PMII, KAMMI, and IMM, while intra-campus organizations, namely LDK Al-Qudwah. KAMMI and LDK Al-Qudwah seemed more intense in holding religious activities than the other three student organizations. The religious activities led to the study of fiqh (*amaliyah*) and the learning of the Qur'an (*tahfiz* and *tahsin*). The audience is not limited to KAMMI and LDK Al-Qudwah, but across organizations. Strengthening *amaliah* is a general motivation for them to join in these religious activities.

> I am PMII, but I also joined LDK. I learned more about religion by reading the Qur'an here (R1).

The intensity of these activities forms a religious understanding that emphasizes the normative rather than substantive-philosophical aspects. The development of *hijrah* discourse and Islamic popularity among students also confirm this trend of understanding. It is expected that the organization's background is not a significant consideration.

No.	Student Organizations	Religious Discourse	Method
1	KAMMI	• *Da'wah* in the millennial era • Strengthening Quran literacy • Paradigm of Islamic movement and politics	• Speech method
2	IMM	• Inclusive Islam, moderation, and movements of national leaders and current issues	• Internal discussion • Regeneration
3	HMI	• Islamic movement during the pandemic • Moderation and tolerance	• Internal discussion
4	PMII	• Tolerance in religious communities to	• Public Seminar

		strengthen the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia • Religious moderation • Understanding related to amaliyah and sects or religious ideas • Religion and state relations	• Internal discussions • Regeneration
5	LDK	• Learning *tahsin* and *tahfidz* • *Da'wah* strategy and management	• Mentoring • Training

Table 2. Trends of Religious Discourse on Student Organizations
(UIN Sultan Thaha Saifudin Jambi)

Table 2 shows that the trend of religious discourse among students of UIN STS Jambi revolves around religious moderation, relations between religion and the state, and Islamic movements. IMM, HMI, KAMMI, and PMII were actively involved in discussing this in the format of seminars, internal discussions, and regeneration/cadre.

An interview with one of the student organizations stated that religious discourse among students tends to be linked to the Indonesian context. They are generally packaged through the thoughts of Indonesian intellectuals. IMM refers to Buya Hamka and Syafii Maarif, PMII to Abdurrahman Wahid's thoughts, and HMI focuses on Nurcholis Madjid's thoughts.

In general, they are more interested in discussing thoughts than ritual-amaliah issues. They also do not bind themselves to a religious sect. Most of them get religious insight from ustadz, who is popular on social media. However, the topics of khilafiyyah received considerable

attention in the campus environment, such as *isbal*, beard, *dzikr jamaah*, *qunut,* and similar ways.

Perppu Ormas No. 2 of 2017 appeared with various responses from campus residents, students, lecturers, and leaders. These differences can be due to academic status, position, and organizational background. The existence of the Perppu Ormas opens a space for the contestation of religious discourse on campus, especially among Islamic student organizations. The cases of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) are examples and indications of the implementation of the Perppu, which has received much public attention.

Cluster	Responses to Perppu Ormas
Student Organizations	• HMI: significant impact, although discussion themes are limited • PMII: very effective in controlling radical groups • IMM: Perppu is in line with the spirit of Muhammadiyah • KAMMI: limiting movement and discussion activities • LDK: no significant impact because the focus is more on recitation (*pengajian*)
Lecturer	• There is prudence, both personal and institutional, in carrying out activities • Minimizing intolerant groups

Campus Leaders	• Initiation of moderation and nationality discussions/seminars are more actively carried out • Bringing order to organizations that have the potential to be infiltrated by ideas that challenge Pancasila

Tabel 3. Responses to Perppu Ormas at IAIN Kerinci

Cluster	Responses To Perppu Ormas
Student Organizations	• HMI: The Perppu needs changes so that external organizations are more flexible in carrying out their functions as agents of change and social control in the community • PMII: Very helpful in organizing detailed arrangements for mass organizations in Indonesia and still strengthening the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia • IMM: Community organizations become limited according to the will or goals of the state. The Perppu has a tremendous impact on regulating every mass organization. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that excessive control approaches totalitarianism. • KAMMI: it is necessary to clarify the implementation of the Perppu, because it can be misused for an interest • LDK: A form of firmness in the law, organizing mass organizations

Lecturer	• Perppu on mass organizations raised controversy • Restrictions on the movement of intolerant mass organizations
Campus Leaders	• Perppu mass organization to counter radicalism • Follow the instructions of the Ministry of Religion by establishing a study center for religious moderation

Tabel 4. Responses to Perppu Ormas at UIN STS Jambi

Tables 3 and 4 show the support and objections at the level of the student organization. Support for the Perppu Ormas is based on the following arguments: 1) neutralizing campuses from radicalism and 2) controlling mass organizations so that they remain in line with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila. Meanwhile, the objection is due to the tendency of the Perppu Ormas to limit the discussion space and themes, which has the potential to be misused. After the Perppu Ormas, student organizations that previously massively voiced the discourse of the caliphate, Islamic state, and anti-system are almost invisible at IAIN Kerinci and UIN STS Jambi.

> After the issuance of the Perppu, they are no longer visible; it seems that there is prudence from both individuals and institutions to carry out their activities (R2).

From interviews, informants from lecturers placed the Perppu Ormas as an effort to minimize the spread of intolerance because there are a small number of students who have gone to extreme levels of thought. R3, the lecturer, conveyed it:

> Radical understanding enters through a dynamic approach, which forms an extreme model of the group, the conformity of his peers is negative, so he claims that his group is correct and the others are wrong (R3).

The infiltration of intolerant understanding on campus is due to the weak guidance of the Student Activity Unit (UKM), so the role is taken over by seniors or alumni, which lecturers should carry out. The absence of clear and standard rules for UKM is also a gap for counterproductive ideas to enter.

Meanwhile, at the leadership level, both at IAIN Kerinci and UIN STS Jambi, the response to the Perppu Ormas was realized by initiating education and training on religious moderation, establishing a moderation house, and seminars on Pancasila ideology and nationalism. The agendas were also reinforced by the instructions from the Ministry of Religion, the state institution which oversees the two campuses in Jambi Province.

Moderation discourse is the main focus (core value) for the two campuses as a form of commitment to strengthen the spirit of nationalism, apart from being part of quality assurance and institutional quality. It also applies to many campuses under PTKIN by establishing Moderation Houses. At IAIN Kerinci, the Moderation House is in the planning stage, while UIN STS Jambi has moved ahead by establishing a Moderation Study Center.

The campus atmosphere like that has led to an automatic prevention mode for things that have extreme nuances. If some students and lecturers are indicated to spread radical ideas, then persuasive coaching is carried out, as stated by one of the campus leaders:

> Nevertheless, the lecturer is attached forever. If the rector and WR 2 called the lecturer, the dialogue and discussion were long. The

rector gave advice and a kind of ultimatum. After that, there is no anymore. In that case, he was intense and active through brochures and sermons, but after being reprimanded, he was no longer massive. Do not know behind us (R4).

Perppu of Mass Organization and Discourse Contestation

Perppu of mass organization No. 2 of 2017, a renewal of Law Number 17 of 2013 about Social Organizations, has appeared to controversy and debate among students. However, the attention point is the implications of Perppu of the mass organization, like HTI and FPI, rather than the material object of Perppu. From several informants, it was confirmed that the word 'dissolution' was more often used for cases of HTI and FPI.

It sparked controversy and debate in the campus environment. The debates that arise can be categorized under several themes: First, democracy deficit. Second, deradicalization, and third, national disintegration. The first theme views the cases of HTI and FPI as an indication of the decline in the democracy index. Freedom of association, expression, and opinion is questioned as to the essence of a democratic state. Those looking at it from this point of view suggest steps of formation rather than disbandment.

It does not have to be disbanded; try it through coaching first. Otherwise, democracy is threatened, sir (R5).

While the second theme departs from the strengthening of the politicization of religion and the use of religion for violence and destructive interests, as well as transnational ideology, the Perppu of a mass organization is considered adequate for controlling mass organizations that are contrary to the Pancasila ideology.

The implications of the Perppu on mass organizations are undoubtedly positive. As in the case of the spread of ideas that are contrary to Pancasila, which is very vulnerable to occur on

campus, this can now be resolved with the existence of this Perppu (R6).

Finally, the group that has direct implications for the existence of Perppu Ormas No. 2/2017, such as HTI and FPI, thus opening a gap for national disintegration. Organizationally, they are no longer active, but ideologically they still exist and move in a hidden and unstructured way. It will undoubtedly make it difficult for the government to identify their movements, especially in cyberspace. One way to do this is by framing national political issues in a negative direction, thereby triggering disintegration and conflict (R7).

Discussion

This study investigates the trend and contestation of religious discourse in the IAIN Kerinci and UIN Sultan Thaha Saifuddin Jambi after the issuance of Perppu of Mass Organizations Number 2 of 2017. This Perppu Ormas demonstrates legal authority through the revocation of permits for two religious organizations in Indonesia: HTI (2017) and FPI (2019). As known, both organizations have militant networks, masses, funding, and actors.[22] Their network is spread out and is active on campus, although organizationally disbanded,[23] Including IAIN Kerinci and UIN Sultan Thaha Saifuddin (STS) Jambi. The critical position of students in Indonesian society has encouraged political and religious groups to build influence on campus.[24] This influence is packaged in various agendas and discourses as a distinction from other groups.

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[22] Philips J. Vermonte, Vidhyandika D. Perkasa, Nicky Fachrizal and Alif Satria, "Gerakan 'Hibrida' Aksi Bela Islam Aktor, Struktur, Motivasi dan Pendanaan", *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, no.1 (2020): 1-27, https://csis.or.id/publications/gerakan-hibrida-aksi-bela-islam-aktor-struktur-motivasi-dan-pendanaan

[23] Zulfadli, "Political Orientation of the Former Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Activists After Being Dissolved," *Jurnal Kontekstualita* 33, no. 2 (2018): 183, 169-189, https://e-journal.lp2m.uinjambi.ac.id/ojp/index.php/Kontekstualita/article/view/133

[24] Yon Machmudi, "Patterns of Controlling Institutions: From Campus to State," in *Islamising Indonesia* (Australia: ANU Press, 2008), https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hddh.12.

The contestation of religious discourse is a manifestation of identity thickening because each group has different principles and orientations. Every organization has a sense of pride that is evidenced through activities and the use of symbols. Thus, it is not uncommon for contestations to trigger violent reactions and conflicts.[25]

As indicated by the research results, the religious discourse that developed on the two campuses tended to accommodate discussions about Islam and nationality, religious moderation, fiqh studies, and the practice of hijrah. The first two themes are motivated by the convergence of discourse at the national level as the antithesis of radicalism and extremism through state institutions.[26] In other words, the discourse was rolled out to maintain the state's existence.[27] While the following two themes indicate the increasing spread of popular Islam (popular Islam) in the campus environment, they can be seen in the fashion model, lifestyle, and language used by students. This trend almost eliminates organizational boundaries because of their orientation on religious identity and habitus. In addition, the popularity of hijrah is often associated with modernity and a dynamic attitude in responding to the development of the times in which young people primarily drive.[28]

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[25] Hasse Jubba, *Kontestasi Identitas Agama: Lokalitas Spiritual di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: The Phinisi Press, 2019), 1-2.

[26] Eve Warburton, "Deepening Polarization and Democratic Decline in Indonesia," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, last modified August 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&u act=8&ved=2ahUKEwiRlNvV7ob6AhViSXwKHYkLDecQFnoECA0QAQ&url=htt ps%3A%2F%2Fcarnegieendowment.org%2F2020%2F08%2F18%2Fdeepening-polarization-and-democratic-decline-in-indonesia-pub-82435&usg=AOvVaw1uJVsdmE601VTiAYeIC7AG.

[27] Hasbi Aswar, "Destructing The Islamist In Indonesia: Joko Widodo Policy and Its Controversy," *International Journal of Malay-Nusantara Studies* 1, no.1 (2018): 62-79, https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/IJoM-NS/article/download/4234/2417.

[28] M.C. Ricklefs, "A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History," in *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History c. 1930 to Present* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012). Also see: Wasisto Raharjo Jati. "Islam Populer sebagai Pencarian Identitas Muslim Kelas Menengah Indonesia," *Teosofi Jurnal*

The preference for religious discourse among students is closely related to religious activism. Generally, the typology of student religious activism can be read based on Azyumardi Azra's categorization.[29] First, students are oriented to religious and spiritual activities. LDK and KAMMI are included in this type through activities of tahsin, tahfidz, morals, and fiqh material. Second, those who grew up in an Islamic environment that is more inclined to the left-wing (leftist). It can generally identify this group of students in terms of literature and discussion themes without specifying a particular student organization. Third, students who prefer to gain organizational and political experience rather than spiritual achievement. Most HMI, IMM, and PMII cadres at IAIN Kerinci and UIN STS Jambi tend to be of this type. Political careers are a consideration for students' participation in these student organizations because of the connections and influence of seniors at the central level.

Based on the political and religious landscape above, the response to the Perppu Ormas Number 2 of 2017, both at IAIN Kerinci and UIN STS Jambi, was heavily influenced by two ideas: the idea of renewal/reformation and Islamism. Student organizations accommodated the idea of renewal through ideas such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Syafii Maarif, and others. This group is more inclined to place the Perppu of Mass Organization as an effort to fortify nationalism and Pancasila from transnational movements. However, some of them are worried about the abuse of power behind the Perppu of Mass Organization in the form of limiting discussions in campus rooms. Meanwhile, sympathizers of the idea of Islamism that emphasize the rise of Islam see the Perppu of Mass Organization as a threat to their activities and the state's antipathy towards Islam.[30] Thus,

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Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam 5, no. 1 (2015): 139-163, http://jurnalfuf.uinsby.ac.id/index.php/teosofi/article/view/96.

[29] Azyumardi Azra, "Kelompok Sempalan di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTU: Anatomi Sosio Historis," in *Dinamika Pemikiran Islam di Perguruan Tinggi: Wacana tentang Pendidikan Agama Islam*, edited by Fuaduddin & Cik Hasan Bisri (Jakarta: Logos, 1999).

[30] Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

the contestation of religious discourse after the Perppu of Mass Organization can be seen from these two ideas.

The role of campus leaders and lecturers is quite significant in forming and strengthening religious discourse. The status of state campuses encourages IAIN Kerinci and UIN STS Jambi to commit to state instructions and policies. Religious moderation has become a central theme on both campuses with the establishment of the Moderation House and intensifying seminars related to it. However, the lecture material (non-extracurricular) has not included the moderation component.

This research reveals that moderate Islamic discourse is positioned as a counter-discourse to radicalism and extremism developed by fundamentalist groups. Even though the organization is no longer active, religious networks and activities still exist through Islamic studies, learning the Qur'an, and social action. Meanwhile, political aspirations are channeled through other groups or parties that align with their ideology. The conditions of pressure and playing victims of government policies encourage them to look for new spaces and structures for the realization of social movements, both openly and hidden.[31] In addition, in many contexts, framing is a necessary process they adopt in conveying ideology on social media by utilizing national political issues.[32]

This research contributes to presenting references or social facts for managing the moderating climate on campus, which departs from the response of campus residents to Perppu of Mass Organization No. 2/2017. Thus, the regulation and moderation agenda that can be carried

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[31] Heather Selma Gregg, "Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence: Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and Apocalyptic Warriors," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28, no.2 (2014): 338-360, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2014.918879.

[32] Noorhaidi Hasan, "Book Review: Islam Politik, Gerakan Sosial, Pencarian Model Kajian Islam Baru Lintas Disiplin," *Al-Jamiah* 44, no. 1 (2006): 248, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2006.441.241-250.

out can be adjusted to the actual conditions, character, and needs of the campus.

Conclusion

This study shows that the Perppu of Mass Organization strengthens the discourse of religious moderation on campus. In other words, the opportunity for religious moderation as a core value at the institutional level gets acceptance from campus elements. However, religious moderation must be translated so that it can be implemented comprehensively and directed. On the other hand, the existence of the Perppu of Mass Organization has suppressed the activities of networks that are contrary to the spirit Of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila. Although not visible on the surface, their ideology and activities continue to develop with a different approach than before.

The contestation of religious discourse at the level of student organizations takes place through seminars and internal discussions. Reflection on nationalism and Islam gets a significant portion by elaborating the thoughts of ideological figures from each organization.

This study recommends that campuses respond to Perppu Ormas No. 2 of 2017 in the context of formulating religious moderation contextually and comprehensively, rather than limiting themselves to static and textual interpretations. It is also essential to ensure that students, lecturers, and campus leaders are not trapped in narrow discourses about radicalism and ignore the essence of campus as a producer of knowledge.

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