



THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC DEFENDERS FRONT ORGANIZATION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MODERATE GROUPS IN THE DYNAMICS OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, Indonesia has been confronted with socio-religious problems, with the discourse of Moderate Islam and Extreme Islam at stake. Because these two groups have fought over the meaning of Islam in the middle of the public space by carrying different Islamic symbols by claiming their respective truths, this has triggered horizontal conflicts based on religion. This phenomenon cannot be separated from the existence of FPI which has attracted a lot of attention among the wider community, both academics and the general public. This research aims; first, to construct the identity of FPI, second, the concept of religious derivation adopted by FPI religious organization, and third, the dissolution of FPI. The method used is discourse analysis based on Michel Foucault's genealogy of power perspective and through a descriptive qualitative approach based on literature study sources. Data in the form of text that can be obtained from scientific literature; in the form of journals, theses, theses, visual-video and other supporting documents. The results show that the dissolution of FPI is inseparable from the power relations of moderate ulema and the government, the findings show that FPI is an embodiment of an organizational movement that tends to be extreme in religious practice. The theoretical implication in this research is as an effort to develop the study of the role of ulema and government in the socio-religious context.

ABSTRAK

Beberapa tahun terakhir Indonesia dihadapkan pada problem sosial keagamaan, diskursus Islam Moderat dan Islam Ekstrem menjadi taruhannya. Karena kedua kelompok ini telah berebut makna Islam di tengah ruang publik dengan mengusung simbol-simbol Islam yang berbeda-beda dan mengklaim kebenaran mereka masing-masing. Hal tersebut memicu terjadinya konflik horizontal yang berbasis pada agama. Fenomena demikian tidak lepas dari keberadaan FPI yang banyak menyita perhatian di kalangan masyarakat luas baik kalangan akademik maupun masyarakat umum. Penelitian ini bertujuan; *pertama*, mengkonstruksi identitas FPI, *kedua*, konsep derivasi keagamaan yang dianut organisasi keagamaan FPI, dan *ketiga*, yakni pembubaran FPI. Metode yang digunakan adalah pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif berdasarkan sumber studi pustaka dan analisis wacana berdasarkan persepektif genealogi kekuasaan Michel Foucault. Data berupa teks yang diperoleh dari literatur ilmiah, seperti jurnal, tesis, skripsi, visual-video dan dokumen pendukung lainnya. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan pembubaran FPI tidak terlepas dari relasi kuasa ulama' moderat dan pemerintah. Berdasarkan temuan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa FPI merupakan perwujudan dari gerakan organisasi yang cenderung ekstrem dalam pengamalan keagamaan. Implikasi teoritik dalam penelitian ini adalah sebagai upaya pengembangan kajian peran ulama dan umara' dalam konteks sosial-keagamaan.

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Introduction

Along with the arrival of the digital era that disrupts various elements of the life of the nation and state, social and religious as a very significant impact. We have felt this and we have observed together that the existence of Islam in the last few years has become a trending topic in the world even in Indonesia. This is suspected of the existence of various different Islamic movements ranging from radical to tolerant. If examined from the history of the Islamic movement in the Islamic world, it is undeniable that the rise of the Indonesian Islamic movement was the impact of the great influence of the contemporary Islamic movement on European imperialism initiated by Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d.1897) who was later popularly known as Pan-Islamism.¹ The rise of Islam in Indonesia began with a renewal of thought. This encouraged the establishment of Islamic organizations that were concerned with social and religious relations, such as Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) 1909 and 1911, in 1912 Muhammadiyah community organizations, Islamic Association (Persis) 1920, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 1926, and Tarbiyah Islamiyah Association (Perti) 1930.²

However, based on the rapid development of the influence of Middle Eastern Islamic culture (Arabism), the existence of Islamic movements in Indonesia has undergone many changes both in terms of thought and movement, some of which have infiltrated into various community organizations that secretly or openly problematic the state with the ideology of Pancasila. The Indonesian Islamic movement transcended social and religious boundaries, they began to be involved in power politics.

The problem of this thinking has an impact on religion facing the state in the public space as a result of religious discourse being placed as an absolute requirement to govern the state. Indirectly, the political design that develops is a politics full of conflicts. Political configurations always present an atmosphere that is not conducive and always confronts religion. Through this academic discourse, the discussion of the issue of contestation between religion and the state in the design of Indonesian politics requires comprehensive observation, because both have different characteristics based on their respective identities, even though the relationship between religion and the state causes a lot of diversity in translating religion as part of the state.³

¹ Muhammad Rusydi, "Transformasi Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Islam Indonesia Kontemporer," TAJDID: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2017), 37.

² Deliar Noer, *Indonesian Islamic Modern Movement 1900-1942* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980).Sec. 23.

³ Azyumardi Azra, *Civil Society Democracy* (Jakarta: Prenada Media, 2023).



Until now, the relationship between Islam and the state as a symbol is still a debate that has not reached a conclusion. The question is, can Islam as a religion regulate state politics clearly and systematically? The emergence of various Islamic civil society organizations (CSOs/*ormas*) and political parties in Indonesia is an interesting phenomenon that deserves to be studied. This phenomenon was triggered by the ongoing debate about the relationship between religion and the state that continues to this day. One of the real examples is the existence of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), FPI emerged in the midst of political turmoil and a situation in the public space that is not conducive to some Muslims in Indonesia. FPI and other Islamic organizations seek to explain the relationship between religion and the state based on what they understand.

Since its inception, FPI has been known as an Islamic mass organization that is active in upholding *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (commanding good and preventing evil). The spirit of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* is the main foundation of FPI in carrying out its various activities. As time goes by, FPI's work has not been spared from controversy. Some people have "uneasiness" over what FPI understands about *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*, because it translates into *sweeping* and raiding actions that cause social conflicts. There are several opinions on the practice of FPI jihad, such as Syamsul Ma'arif who said that FPI's actions can be understood as an effort to achieve piety,⁴ while according to Fahrudin Faiz that FPI's actions are a vertical-horizontal problem because they make religion as a justification for actions that some people consider acts of violence.⁵

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), an Islamic organization founded in 1998 by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, was officially dissolved by the Indonesian government on December 30, 2020. Since June 21, 2019, FPI's SKT (Registered Certificate) as a mass organization in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) has expired and FPI has not extended the SKT. So on December 30, 2020, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Legal Affairs Mahfud MD announced that FPI was officially dissolved. The dissolution provoked debate, including hashtag contestation on social media Twitter #TetapTegakWalaupunTanganTerikat Vs #FPITerlarang. #TetapTegakWalaupunTanganTerikat means showing support for FPI

⁴ Syamsul Ma'arif, "Understanding Diversity and the Movement of the FPI Surabaya Group" *Theology*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2012): 309.

⁵ Fahrudin Faiz, "ISLAMIC DEFENDERS FRONT: Between violence and religious maturity," *Kalam*, vol. 8, No. 2 (2014): 347.



participants and some people who support the *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* understood by FPI. Meanwhile, #FPITerlarang, is a form of anger from non-Muslims and Muslims.

In this section, the author will explain matters related to tracing the results of previous studies. The literature review from this previous research aims to ascertain the differences between authors and other researchers in raising the same topic. As a result of this research, the researcher presents academic novelty and perspectives based on religious and sociological political perspectives, to analyze and examine the interaction of religious authorities and the state in shaping legitimacy in the dissolution of FPI. In addition, this study presents the dimension of religious discourse used by Indonesian scholars in responding to the dissolution of FPI.

The journal entitled "Thoughts and Influence of the Islamic Defenders Front in Indonesia" was published in *Religious Studies and Theology* in 2022 and was written by Nanang Hasan Susanto and Maghfur Ahmad. This research tries to construct radical groups in Indonesia, including discussing the position of FPI as part of a group that has a religious viewpoint and application that is quite intolerant of Islamic groups that grow and develop with moderate traditions. This study focuses on the influence of FPI on the concept of diversity in Indonesia, and its involvement in the application of Islamic sharia.⁶

Furthermore, a journal research by Pitoyo Ismail, Edy Prihantoro, and Noviawan Rasyid Ohorella with the title "*Analisis Kebijakan dan Komunikasi Pemerintah dalam Membubarkan Front Pembela Islam (FPI)*," was published in *Wacana: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, in 2021. FPI has been a community organization since its establishment until its dissolution its popularity has often increased and become a public conversation. This study analyzes the dissolution of FPI based on the perspective of framing mass media, including an analysis of Robert Endman's textual and sociocultural production. At least in the research conducted by Pitoyo Ismail, Edy Prihantoro, and Noviawan Rasyid Ohorella, there are three online media that are presented as a source of analysis and guidance to construct—the dimension of the dissolution of FPI; *kompas.com*, *republika.co.id*, and *detik.com*. The practice of discourse in this research is presented as a framing to find out the role and space of the mass media in popularizing the dissolution of FPI, and becoming a public conversation.⁷

⁶ Nanang Hasan Susanto and Maghfur Ahmad, "Thoughts and Influence of the Islamic Defenders Front in Indonesia," *Religious Studies and Theology* 41, no. 1 (2022): 57–76.

⁷ Pitoyo Ismail, Edy Prihantoro, and Noviawan Rasyid Ohorella, "Policy and Communication Analysis of the Government in Dissolving the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)," *WACANA: Scientific Journal of Communication Sciences* 20, no. 2 (2021): 268–79.



This research aims to; *first*, constructing the identity of FPI, *second*, the concept of religious derivation adopted by FPI religious organizations, and, *third*, namely the dissolution of FPI. The method used is discourse analysis based on the perspective of the genealogy of power of Michel Foucault, through a descriptive qualitative approach based on literature study sources. Data in the form of texts that can be obtained from scientific literature, such as journals, theses, theses, visual-videos and other supporting documents. The results of the study show that the dissolution of FPI is inseparable from the power relationship between moderate ulema and the government. The findings show that FPI is a manifestation of an organizational movement that tends to be extreme in religious practice.

The previous research above provides an overview of FPI as a community organization that interacts directly with the public. The first study in-depth classified FPI as an extreme organization, while the second research focused on mass media platforms, specifically how media framing plays its role in shaping the extremist identity of FPI community organizations. Both of them talk about FPI but have different perspectives and research directions. Meanwhile, in the research that I propose is the involvement of Indonesian ulemas who adhere to the moderate tradition, who actively criticize the actions of FPI. This research also emphasizes the importance of government preanance in maintaining peace, religious and cultural diversity from the threat of transnational ideologies.

This euphoria is a phenomenon as well as a religious problem in Indonesia, because both use sacred texts as a reference base with interpretations that tend to be sharp, so that it affects the development of religion in Indonesia both from social, political and the values of change. Thus, this article will try to analyze and critique religious phenomena in the context of the dissolution of FPI dissected through the analysis of Michel Foucault's genealogical theory of power.

Results

A. History of FPI's Existence in Indonesia

The 1998 reform, was the initial momentum for the entry of social movements known as the movement of the return to the authoritarianism government (the new order). In some of the momentum resulting from the transition from the new order to reform, the dynamics of social movements tend to dominate, while the role of the ruler is not able to fully control the movement, resulting in an imbalance in public order. Various situations are used to consolidate massively by various community groups that have their own interests.



The Soeharto regime often presented conflicts in society (the gap between community relations to the government and society to society), such as the tragedies of Ambon,⁸ Aceh,⁹ Poso,¹⁰ and Irian.¹¹ According to Al-Zastrouw Ng, the post-new order community movement is a movement of the community's return flow.¹² And Zastrouw revealed that community organizations with Islamic ideology such as FPI were formed from these situations and conditions, because according to FPI, the practice of evil must be stopped with the concept of sharia or Islamic law.

Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is an organization established on August 17, 1998 at the Al-Umm Islamic Boarding School, Ciputat, South Jakarta, has been part of the dynamics of Indonesia for approximately 18 years. The idea of establishing FPI came from Habaib, Islamic activists, and was led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab as its commander and pioneer.¹³ The transition from reform to democracy is what has become a new civilization for some Muslims in Indonesia and FPI itself has gained momentum in it. The presence of FPI is not only about religious theological problems, but also about power politics which refers to religious modes to overcome social gaps and conflicts in society.

Various factors are the reasons for the establishment of FPI. One of them is the situation of suffering experienced by Muslims in Indonesia due to the lack of social supervision from the rulers, which leads to human rights violations by the regime. In addition, the emergence of various actions that are considered as iniquity and disobedience that are increasingly widespread

⁸ The conflict in Ambon was a conflict involving Muslims and Christians in 1999, and resulted in casualties, see in, Ernita Krisandi et al., "Resolution of Communal Conflicts in Maluku after reformasi," *Journal of Government Science Undip* Vol. 2, No, no. 2 (2013): 1-9.

⁹ Even with the conflict in Aceh which often raises questions related to the system from the colonial era to the reform era, plus the spirit of regional autonomy, read more at, Imam Hadi Sutrisno, "Ethnic Conflict in Aceh During the Reform Period, 1998-2005," *Indonesian Historical Studies* Vol. 2, No, no. 1 (2018): 1-12.

¹⁰ Meanwhile, in Poso, the conflict also involved Christians and Muslims which coincided with the ouster of President Soeharto in 1998, and resulted in the decentralization of power. The conflict in Poso is so tragic, not a few women are victims of sexual harassment, A. Juliansyah, E., & Rizal, "The Poso Conflict (Historical Study of 1998-2001)," *Criksetra: Journal of Historical Education* Vol. 5, No, no. 10 (2016): 166-73.

¹¹ According to historical facts, under the Suharto regime, Papua was often the target of military operations and the subject of capitalistic development policies. As a result, there is an increasing power conflict in the Papuan region. After the reform, the spirit of freedom possessed by Papuans began to encourage brands to voice their aspirations related to Papuan independence as a state openly, see dim M Sofyan Pulungan, "The Dynamics of Conflict in Papua Post-New Order," *Journal of Law & Development* Vol. 33, N, no. 4 (2017): 516-36.

¹² Al-Zastrouw Ng, *Symbolic Islamic Movement: The Politics of FPI Interests* (Yogyakarta: Lkis, 2006). Sec. 86.

¹³ According to Habib Rizieq, the establishment of FPI was due to rampant injustice and rampant disobedience that had an impact on damage and was considered to invite disaster, *Ibid*, 89.



are also the reason and background for the establishment of FPI. This organization feels that it has a responsibility to maintain the honor of the ummah (especially Muslims) as a religion.¹⁴

FPI has a vision and mission that is the foundation for its movement and ideology. FPI's vision is to implement the enforcement of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* as the only solution to avoid evil. FPI's vision shows the ultimate goal of this organization, which is to create an ideal society. While its mission is not only to implement the enforcement of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* comprehensively in all aspects of life, its mission is also to create a society that lives in the blessings bestowed by Allah SWT.

According to Zastrouw, FPI has a doctrine of struggle that includes several aspects, such as giving up intentions, initiating change from oneself, upholding the truth, exterminating iniquity, realizing that everyone will face death, and fighting the enemies of Islam.¹⁵ As a community organization, FPI has basic principles that are the foundation of the struggle. These principles are:

1. God is our Lord and our goal
2. The Qur'an is our Imam
3. Jihad is our way
4. As-syahadah is our ambition

The five basic principles of FPI above have been firmly rooted in the practice of *da'wah Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah* (Aswaja). On this basis, FPI with its proselytizing spirit can easily expand in order to protect the country with the upholding of Islamic sharia.¹⁶ In "*Risalah Historis dan Garis Perjuangan FPI*," it is explained how the FPI translates the understanding of *Ahlussunnah wal jam'ah* (Aswaja).

Aswaja is understood by the FPI as the main foundation that binds all its members in religious beliefs and practices. According to FPI, Aswaja is not only a religious concept, but also an ideology of struggle that underlies the actions and activities of the organization. FPI understands Aswaja as a concept that unites Muslims in teachings and practices derived from the Qur'an, the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, *Ijma'* (the consensus of ulema), and *Qiyas*. They believe that the appreciation and practice of Aswaja is the key to the success of Muslims in living the life of this world and the hereafter. Furthermore, FPI also translates the understanding of Aswaja as the

¹⁴ Ibid, Al-Zastrow Ng, *The Symbolic Islamic Movement*. Sec. 89.

¹⁵ Ng, *Symbolic Islamic Movement: The Politics of FPI Interests*.

¹⁶ Ibid, Zastrwo Ng. 89



basis for their struggle in defending the teachings of Islam and defending Muslims from all forms of oppression and arbitrariness. By referring to the principles of Aswaja, FPI articulates its goals and methods of struggle to achieve justice and equality for Muslims.¹⁷

The interpretation of Awaja by FPI is different from Awaja understood by NU and Muhammadiyah. FPI adopted Awaja which was practiced by Ustad Ja'far Umar Talib in Yogyakarta. This shows that FPI has a close relationship with the Salafi group, where both interpret the truth in the Qur'an and Hadith based on *tabi'in* who learned directly from the companions of the Prophet Muhammad.

This difference lies mainly in the approach and emphasis in Islamic teachings. FPI tends to prioritize emphasis on the truth interpreted through the understanding of *tabi'in*, which emphasizes the literal and traditional interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith. Meanwhile, NU and Muhammadiyah, although they also adhere to Aswaja, have a more open approach to the modern social and cultural context, and combine rational and contextual approaches in understanding Islamic teachings. Despite this, it is important to remember that despite the differences in interpretation, all of these groups still recognize the Qur'an and Hadith as the main sources of Islamic teachings, and strive to practice religious teachings according to their respective understandings.¹⁸

FPI does not admit that the origin of the concept of understanding Aswaja comes from Abu Hasan al-As'ari and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, as understood by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). In FPI's view, the emphasis is more on the teachings of *tabi'in* who learned directly from the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. They prioritize traditional interpretations that emphasize the literal understanding of the Qur'an and Hadith as well as salaf methodology.¹⁹ These differences show variations in the understanding and emphasis of Islamic teachings among different groups and organizations. Nonetheless, it is important to note that despite the differences in interpretation, the ultimate goal of all these groups remains to practice and practice the teachings of Islam in accordance with their respective understandings and beliefs.

¹⁷ Ibid, Risalah Historis dan Garis Perjuangan FPI, dapat dilihat dalam Zastrow Ng.

¹⁸ Hal tersebut dapat dijumpai di Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Mengenal Sejarah dan Pemahaman Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah", *Buletin Salafi*, Edisi I, (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Assunnah, 1995), 14 yang dikutip oleh Sholihul Huda, "Fpi: Potret Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Studi Agama* Vol. 5, No (2019): 2., 8.

¹⁹ Ibid, Sholihul Huda.



FPI has several foundations for its reference to the salaf generation. *First*, (Q.s. al-Fath: 18), *Second*, (Q.s. al-Baqarah: 143), *Third*, (Q.s. al-Baqarah: 137).²⁰ This verse is used as an excuse by salaf groups, including FPI, in acting and thinking about Islam. The difference between the two is an act of understanding, if the salaf who are members of the *Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunah wal Jama'ah* (FKAWJ) tend to be orthodox and intolerant in affirming the symbolization of Islam, while the FPI in the application of Aswaja and the affirmation of Islamic symbolization is a little looser and softer, only when the actions and demonstrations carried out by FPI apply it in an orthodox and intolerant manner.

The decision and resolution of the FPI's Third National Conference in 2012 affirm that article 6 of the constitution establishes the direction and objectives of FPI. The direction and purpose is to apply the principles of Islamic sharia comprehensively under the leadership of the Islamic caliphate which is based on the guidelines of *Nubuwwah*. The approach taken to achieve this direction and purpose is through da'wah activities, the practice of jihad, and the implementation of *hisbah*.²¹

Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab said that the enforcement of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar is an alternative way and the only way to prevent tyranny and unjust practices. In this view, efforts to encourage and uphold good and reject all forms of evil are considered crucial steps in building a just and moral society²². Zastrouw said that FPI's religious understanding is scripturalist-symbolic, so its actions often violate the substance of the teachings of Islam itself.

FPI's membership is classified into several sections based on social class and the capacity of each movement in achieving FPI's ideals. FPI membership is tied to loyalty and morality to the leader, in this case Habaib. According to Zastrouw, FPI did not conduct *formal* recruitment.²³ The social classes of FPI can be classified into several social structures, and the following are in the form of a table:²⁴

²⁰ Ng, *Symbolic Islamic Movement: The Politics of FPI Interests*. 98-99.

²¹ Bismar Arianto, "Memahami Front Pembela Islam: Gerakan Aksi Atau Negara Islam," *Jurnal Communitarian*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2019), 153.

²² Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, *Dialog Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ibnu Sidah, (2013), 13. Dikutip oleh R A Putra, "Pandangan Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Terhadap Islam Nusantara," *Repository.Uinjkt.Ac.Id* (2020), 56.

²³ Ng, *Gerakan Islam Simbolik: Politik Kepentingan FPI*. 126

²⁴ Ng. 127



Table 1
Distribution of FPI Social Structure

Social Class	Community background	Social Movements
<i>Haba'ib</i>	Religious groups and religious teachers and preachers	A section that can determine the direction and policies of respected organizations and groups
Intellectuals	This group is people who have a certain scientific capacity and have little religious understanding	This group can be classified in its level, such as students, and lecturers, groups that have great influence
Street Thugs	Most of this group comes from a social background with minimal religious knowledge	This group is trained and trained for physical strength, because this group often follows and performs <i>sweeping actions</i> .
Ordinary People	Labour, social and mostly non-religious society dan minim ilmu keagamaan	This group is a group that routinely participates in studies and da'wah to seek peace and happiness in the last day.

The division of this group is based on authority and moral legitimacy in the social structure of the FPI. The social classes that have been divided as in the table above are in charge of carrying out FPI's social activities, based on the motives of their respective movements. So that its existence can spread and infiltrate several groups. According to Zastrouw, part of the social composition of FPI members has heterogeneous backgrounds. Some have received religious education, while others have not. The members came from various regions, including Madura, Banten, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), Batak, and Ambon.²⁵

A. Dissolution of the FPI: Between the Ulema and the Government

Front Pembela Islam Indonesia (FPI) often deals with groups characterized by moderate Islam and government policies, especially about the concept of the state and nation. In 2002, FPI took a step that was considered extreme by demanding the addition of the phrase "the obligation to

²⁵ Ng.124.



carry out Islamic sharia for its adherents" in Article 29 of the 45th Constitution which states "The State based on the One God" when it was being discussed in the amendment of the 45th Constitution by the MPR.

In various situations, the existence of the FPI is often considered a threat to national integrity and harmony. In response to this, the government dissolved FPI through a joint decree of the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, the Minister of Communication and Information, the Attorney General, the Head of the Indonesian National Police, and the Head of the National Agency for Countering Theorism. This dissolution was announced on December 30, 2022 through an official letter

The presence of FPI has been considered a violation of Law No. 17 of 2013 which regulates the existence of community organizations. Article 59 of the law affirms that civil society organizations are prohibited from committing acts that incite hostility based on ethnicity, race, religion, and class. In addition, they are also prohibited from taking actions that can disturb public order. The law also stipulates sanctions that will be imposed if a community organization violates these provisions.²⁶

The dissolution of FPI gave birth to many debates. This is because the existence of FPI is considered to be a community organization that is engaged in the social sphere and eradicates the increasingly rampant acts of evil. On the other hand, in every FPI movement that is closely associated with religious symbolism, FPI makes religion a reference for its actions even though its actions violate state rules and disturb the comfort of religious people, one of which is the enforcement of the Islamic khilfah in the midst of the heterogeneity of religious adherents. The following are some of the steps taken by FPI in supporting the enforcement of the Islamic caliphate and Islamic law:

1. Encourage the improvement of the role and function of the *Organisasi Konferensi Islam/OKI* (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
2. Supporting the establishment of the parliament of the Islamic world
3. Supporting the establishment of an Islamic world market
4. Supporting the establishment of a defense of the Islamic world
5. Supporting the unification of the Islamic world's currencies
6. Supporting the abolition of passports and visas in the Islamic world

²⁶ Ismail, Prihantoro, and Ohorella.: 269.



7. Supporting the ease of marriage assimilation in the Islamic world
8. Supporting the harmonization of general curriculum of religious and general education in the Islamic world
9. Supporting the creation of communication satellites for the Islamic world
10. Supporting the establishment of the International Islamic Court

The ten steps that FPI encouraged can be seen in the “*anggaran dasar rumah tangga (AD/ART)*” article six (6) of the FPI.²⁷ Then followed by the spirit of enforcing Islamic sharia which is often socialized in various moments, such as *majlis talim*, dialogue, *sweeping* actions (practice of jihad). The application of FPI's Islamic Sharia can be found in digital track records, such as the fourth (4th) anniversary of FPI in 2002 at the FPI headquarters which was attended by FPI officials. In the milad event, Rizieq Shihab read an Islamic sharia petition. He encouraged MPR members to present the phrase Islamic sharia in the 45th Constitution, because according to him Muslims long for the law of Allah in Indonesia to be enforced.²⁸

In 2017, coinciding with the momentum of the 212th reunion, Habib Rizieq Shihab reaffirmed Islamic law. In his speech he revealed "we must apply the laws of the Qur'an, we must advance towards a blessed Indonesia and uphold the Islamic Republic of Indonesia".²⁹

FPI is present in various moments to affirm its identity, even FPI is involved in helping people affected by disasters. However, what is popular in the public is the *sweeping* action or known as anti-vice operations. The popularity of FPI was recorded in the minds of the public summarized by the Wahid Institute from 2001-2006 and quoted by Rubaidi. The following matters that are of public concern can be seen in the table below³⁰

Table 2
FPI Action Notes

FPI Action According to Wahid Institute's Notes		
No.	Year	FPI Action

²⁷ Arianto, “Memahami Front Pembela Islam: Gerakan Aksi Atau Negara Islam.”

²⁸ FPI Mendesak Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam, selengkapanya di [FPI Mendesak Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam - News Liputan6.com](https://www.liputan6.com/news/islam/20171202080637-20-259615/rizieq-dorong-konsep-nkri-bersyariah-di-reuni-alumni-212), Diakses pada 09-Juni-2023

²⁹ Rizieq Dorong Konsep NKRI Bersyariah, dapat dilihat di <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20171202080637-20-259615/rizieq-dorong-konsep-nkri-bersyariah-di-reuni-alumni-212>, diakses pada 09 juni 2023

³⁰ Rubaidi, “Variasi Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia,” *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 11, no. 1 (2011): 33–52.



1.	2001	FPI and its supporters held an action at the DPR/MPR building demanding the restoration of the Jakarta Charter
2.	2001	FPI involved in commotion at the US embassy office
3.	2001	Involved in clashes with the police
4.	2001	There was a clash between FPI and students who supported Mixilmina Munir at the South Jakarta District Court
5.	2002	Causing riots with local residents, due to FPI holding a raid by damaging the facilities of a cafe
6.	2002	The Riot of FPI and the Jakarta International Container Terminal Security Unit
7.	2003	A 10-member FPI soldier was involved in the persecution of a man on a toll road
8	2004	FPI bertindak dalam operasi pengepungan pekarangan sekolah Sang Timur
10	2005	FPI attacks Ahmadiyah congregation in Bogor
11.	2005	FPI membongkar dan menghentikan pembangunan taman kanak-kanak Tunas Pertiwi
12.	2005	FPI forced to close the Urban/Culture photo exhibition at the Bank Indonesia Season, Jakarta
13.	2005	Expelling Pilgrims Who Hold Services in Bekasi
14.	2006	Carried out the act of disbanding and expulsion of Abdurrahman Wahid in an event.

These are some of the records from the Wahid Institute in FPI's involvement in the *sweeping action* in Indonesia. FPI has become one of the popular organizations in the religious



discourse space. FPI occupied the most dominant position in the 2001-2006 period. The humanitarian action carried out by FPI is not comparable to *the sweeping* action carried out in public spaces. According to Rubaidi, FPI has never been absent from *sweeping* actions at certain moments, such as during the holy month of Ramadan. They often raid places to eat and beat people who are not fasting. This is done in order to have a deterrent impact on activities that violate the rules of Islam. Here are some incidents involving violent acts committed by FPI, as reported by Tempo:³¹

1. In September 1999, FPI was involved in the closure of a gambling site in North Petojo and a prostitution site in Tanah Abang, Jakarta
2. On May 4, 2001, at the SCTV Office, Jakarta, FPI protested against the broadcast of the telenovela Esmeralda because a character named Fatimah was considered an antagonist who could portray the same image as Fatimah Azzahra, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.
3. On April 20, 2003, FPI leader Habib Rizieq was arrested for allegedly insulting the police in an interview on a TV station. He managed to escape but was eventually arrested and sentenced to seven months in prison
4. On October 28, 2004, FPI often conducted pilgrimages or sweeping during the holy month of Ramadan if it was caught selling or doing activities that were prohibited by religion during that month.
5. On November 1, 2004, a group of FPI vandalized a café, causing a clash with the Kemang Community Forum.
6. On December 23, 2004, FPI members were involved in a riot with the Tanjung Priok JICT Security Guard.
7. On June 27, 2005, the Miss Waria pageant in Jakarta was vandalized and attacked by FPI members.
8. On July 9, 2005, a mob wearing FPI attributes stormed Mubarak's campus with an ultimatum to return and act decisively within seven days.
9. On April 12, 2006, the offices of Playboy magazine were attacked and vandalized by a group of FPIs.

³¹ Rentetan Aksi FPI dari Masa Ke Masa, dapat dilihat, [Rentetan Aksi FPI dari Masa ke Masa - Nasional Tempo.co](#), diakses 09-Juni-2023



10. On May 20, 2006, a group of FPI sealed the office of the Fahmina Institute in Cirebon for rejecting the Anti-Pornography Bill.
11. On June 1, 2008, a group of FPI partisans carried out physical attacks on 27 AKKBB activists, leading to the arrest of FPI leader Habib Rizieq and 59 of his followers.
12. In October 2009, a group of FPI held a demonstration in front of the production house of Maxina Picture to protest the arrival of Japanese artist Maria Ozawa.
13. On April 31, 2010, the Waria event at the Bumi Wiyata Hotel, Depok, was dissolved by a group of FPI, because it was considered deviant from Islamic teachings.
14. On June 24, 2010, FPI, together with the Forum of Religious Ummah and NGOs, dissolved a free health socialization event organized by the House of Representatives Commission IX due to his alleged involvement as a former PKI.
15. On February 10, 2011, FPI Secretary General Munarman threatened former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono regarding the dissolution of the FPI organization.
16. On July 26, 2011, a group of FPIs were involved in the destruction of the Waria building in Purwokerto, Central Java.
17. On August 8, 2011, the Coto Makassar stall on AP Pettara street was damaged by FPI for selling in the month of Ramadan.
18. On August 20, 2011, FPI launched an action at a food stall in Bogor, West Java, also because it sells during the month of Ramadan.
19. On August 27, 2011, the FPI stormed the SCTV office and demanded the cancellation of the screening of the film "FPI Menilai Film" which was considered to depict Muslims as violent people.
20. On October 28, 2011, hundreds of FPI members were involved in the destruction of a Daihatsu Luxio car in Senayan, Central Jakarta, and were involved in a riot with the Bekasi Metro Police during a demonstration in front of the Mahanaim Foundation School due to alleged apostasy.
21. On January 12, 2012, FPI together with the Muslim Ummah Forum (*Forum Umat Islam/FUI*) held a demonstration at the Ministry of Home Affairs office, where the mob was involved in throwing stones and rotten eggs at the building in protest against the cancellation of the making of the Regional Regulation related to liquor.

Tempo released several actions carried out by FPI in various important places and moments. FPI was present in attacks, raids, dispersals, beatings, closures and similar actions that resulted



in clashes between fellow local residents. From such an incident, the FPI organization is considered to disturb public order and comfort.³²

The policy taken by the coordinating ministry for political, legal, and security affairs (*Kemenko Polhukam*) regarding the determination of the prohibition of FPI activities has sparked political and religious discourse and has implications for the issue of freedom of opinion and association. Fadli Zon, a Gerindra politician, voiced the opinion that the dissolution of FPI was not based on a court decision. Fadli Zon emphasized that FPI still recognizes Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the foundation of their existence in Indonesia.³³ The statements of Asfinawati and Fadli Zon on Kompas Tv reflect concerns about the process of dissolving the FPI which is considered not in accordance with the principles of democracy and the rule of law. They also highlighted the potential negative impact of dealing with FPI problems.

On the other hand, government and public representatives who are pro to the dissolution of FPI have different arguments. The Deputy of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, stated that FPI had been declared dissolved through the SKB because it did not extend the SKT. The SKT is a legal requirement for organizations to operate in Indonesia and FPI has not shown good faith to extend the SKT. Meanwhile, Maman Imanulhaq's statement said that the dispersal of FPI was very disruptive to order. FPI often carries out violent actions, such as raids, sweeping, and anti-minorities who have different religious beliefs. FPI's actions disturb the community and create fear. Based on the contents of the joint decree (*Surat Keputusan Bersama/SKB*), it was stated that FPI was prohibited from carrying out activities on behalf of the FPI symbol at various moments.

The decision to dissolve FPI was based on SKB signed by six ministers and heads of institutions, namely:

1. Minister of Home Affairs
2. Minister of Law and Human Rights
3. Minister of Communication and Information Technology
4. Attorney
5. Chief of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia

³² Selengkapnya dapat dilihat melalui <https://www.tempo.co/politik/rentetan-aksi-fpi-dari-masa-ke-masa-nbsp-1699034>. Diakses pada 9 Juni 2023

³³ Selengkapnya dapat dilihat melalui <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/285000/12/pemerintah-bubarkan-fpi-fadli-zon-otoritarianisme-dan-pembunuhan-demokrasi-1609312373>. Diakses pada 9 Juni 2023



6. Head of the National Agency for Counter-Terrorism.

And the decree is attached in Number 220-4780 in 2020, Number M.HH-14. HH.05.05 of 2020, Number 690 in 2020, Number 264 in 2020, Number KB/3/XII/2020, Number 320 in 2020. The decree states that FPI has been dissolved because its existence does not extend its registered certificate (*Surat Keterangan Terdaftar/SKT*), carries out activities that are contrary to law and public order, and spreads hatred and hostility.³⁴

The jargon of moderation and the jargon of extremism are symbolically based jargons, both of which have their own idealistic interests. The dissolution of FPI needs to be supported by these two symbols based on facts. In Indonesia, moderation and extremism are two poles that are often debated. Moderation is represented by organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, while extremism is associated with organizations that are intolerant and anti-pluralism. FPI is an organization led by Rizieq Shihab, often categorized as an extremist organization. However, interestingly, Rizieq Shihab has the NU gene based on KH. Ma'ruf Amin's statement. therefore it is possible that FPI has the same ideological roots as NU, but then developed in a more extreme direction. FPI is categorized as an extremist organization that was dissolved by the government.³⁵

Despite having the same ideological roots as the NU, FPI is often associated with extremism. This raises the question: is FPI really characterized by moderate Islam? Some facts show that FPI does not reflect religious moderation, such as the lack of breadth in attitudes. This can be seen when FPI is too rigid and intolerant of differences of opinion. FPI seems to focus more on certain aspects of Islam and ignore other aspects. FPI often uses harsh and provocative symbols and rhetoric and engages in actions that are considered intolerant and discriminatory against minority groups.³⁶

The existence of Indonesian Ulema does not directly have a role in the dissolution of FPI, but its existence seeks to *counter* the FPI movement and the da'wah carried out. In addition to

³⁴ Selengkapnya dapat dilihat melalui, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mlJrBx_vsj6urjnQGU3tc4X4NrnEzKzI/view. Diakses pada 10-Juni-2023

³⁵ Jubir Wapres: Latar Belakang Rizieq itu NU, selengkapnya dapat dilihat di: <https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2020/11/06/337/2305425/jubir-wapres-latar-belakang-habib-rizieq-itu-nu>. Diakses pada, 10-Juni-2023

³⁶ Aksi-Aksi *Sweeping* FPI yang Resahkan Warga, dapat dilihat di: <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qm5g85320/aksiaksi-sweeping-fpi-yang-resahkan-warga>. Diakses pada 10-Juni-2023



FPI importing the Salafi style as *Manhajl Fikr wal-Harakah* based on the nomenclature of its da'wah method to reach the peak of "piety" in religion, FPI with its *sweeping* style is very disturbing to the harmony of society, religion is shackled in the FPI political space. This is the concern of Indonesian scholars to reduce and narrow the movements of Islamic mass organizations that have the potential to undermine the heterogeneity of a society rich in religion, culture and tradition.

The view of the Chairman of PBNU, Marsudi Syuhud agreed with the dissolution of FPI on the grounds that FPI is considered contrary to the principles of Pancasila as a way of life. According to him, the dissolution of FPI is the right step to ensure the stability and harmony of the nation.³⁷ Although FPI is spreading through a series of dialogues, it is fairly rigid in acculturating local culture, Indonesian culture that is integrated into the principles of religious values that it understands.

FPI makes religion not only a spiritual understanding and theological tradition, but also converted in the political space. This is the obstacle for FPI itself in expanding its da'wah and its ideology (salafi). because the development of religion in Indonesia is a religious life that is full of tolerance, harmony, and moderation. Meanwhile, FPI does not have a moderate understanding both in acting and preaching. FPI often presents vertical-horizontal conflicts.

Discussion

Michel Foucault's Power Relations and the Dissolution of FPI

Foucault has two methods in his scientific discourse, including; Archaeology and genealogy based on the basis of epistemology, discourse and power. Foucault often talks about power because he is influenced by the events that occur around him. According to him, power is something that is not focused on one agency, its existence is everywhere because it is related to social relations³⁸. Foucault needed a knowledge of language to interpret power, because power would bring knowledge.³⁹ Power is born based on knowledge and discourse can produce

³⁷ Nu: Bubarkan FPI Tidak Berarti Pemerintah Anti Islam, <https://m.jpnn.com/news/nu-bubarkan-fpi-tidak-berarti-pemerintah-anti-islam>. Diakses pada 24-Juni-2023

³⁸ Alfathri Adlin, "Michel Foucault: Kuasa/Pengetahuan, (Rezim) Kebenaran, Parrhesia," *Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah Dan Filsafat Islam*, 2016.

³⁹ Titin Ratu, *Analisis Wacana Seksualitas Di Dalam Film All You Need Is Love-Meine Schwiegertochter Ist Ein Mann* (Jakarta, 2012). 21.



knowledge itself so that it becomes a weapon in making power policies, because the two are interrelated with each other.⁴⁰

According to Foucault, every life of society has a regime that gives rise to power and power relations apply according to social needs. For this reason, knowledge of language is needed to produce a discourse according to the interests of the ruler. Because according to Foucault, language is something that can control the power and discourse of the ruler. Therefore, language will continue to be intertwined with the production of discourse and the control of power. The power in Foucault's practice is to move according to their respective times.⁴¹

Michel Foucault's power genealogy method can be used to analyze the dissolution of FPI in the context of the social reality space of power. In this theory, it focuses on how discourse (knowledge and truth) is shaped and legitimized by power relations. Foucault's genealogy is to provide a scientific discourse on the issue in proportion to a critical interpretation based on knowledge of language and the strength of discourse.⁴² Therefore, the use of discourse methods, knowledge of language and power is the right analysis to dissect and discuss interpretively and dialogically.

In people's lives, of course, they are very attached to the power produced by the government or regime. According to Foucault, a regime is directly related to power, where power produces the product of rules produced from the discourse that is carried out. Every discourse that arises will always be in the form of knowledge and perpetuated in the practice of power. The government, based on its power relations, succeeded in banning and breaking the chain of legality of FPI as a community organization. This is based on the process of observation and social analysis in the field about the facts of FPI's religious movements and ideology.

1. Authority to Prohibit FPI Organizations

The Government's power relations are reflected in a decision taken through the issuance of the decision to dissolve FPI based on a SKB signed by six ministers and heads of institutions. This incident resulted in a new polemic, namely the rejection of some Indonesian people for the issuance of the decision, such as the trending hashtag on Twitter

⁴⁰ Abdullah Khozin Afandi, "Konsep Kekuasaan Michel Foucault," *Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam*, 2015, <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2012.2.1.131-149>. 133.

⁴¹ Ketut Wiradnyana, *Michel Foucault Arkeologi Pengetahuan Dan Pengetahuan Arkeologi* (Jakarta: yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2018). 39.

⁴² Adlin, "Michel Foucault: Kuasa/Pengetahuan, (Rezim) Kebenaran, Parrhesia."



#StayUprightEvenWhenYourHandsAreTied since December 30, 2020 and here are two captures as a representation of his popularity on social media Twitter.



Figures 1 and 2: account @pakarkampanye dan account @BalckYudhistira

The two images above show the popularity of the hashtag which is the public's voice against FPI's defense which flooded the main topic of the public on social media twitter in 2020. They voiced their aspirations about the Government no longer applying the principles of justice and democratic principles when FPI as an organization was declared dissolved and banned through a decree of the Decree.

The decision to dissolve and ban the FPI organization turned out to be enough to have a harmonized impact on religious life and the political world which is quite stable in Indonesia. This was confirmed by Mahfud MD as the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.⁴³

⁴³ Mahfud MD: Kondisi Politik Stabil Pasca Pembubaran FPI, keterangan lebih lengkapnya dapat diketahui melalui link berikut, <https://beritasubang.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/pr-1333327754/mahfud-md-kondisi-politik-stabil-pasca-pembubaran-fpi>. Diakses, 06-Agustus-2023.



FPI's activities gave birth to a discourse in the Government's power niche, leading to the dissolution and dismissal of FPI as a community organization. Of course, the dissolution is based on observation, analysis, and consideration. Foucault clearly states that discourse has created knowledge and that knowledge will always be a tool of power.⁴⁴ The government, based on the analysis of this knowledge, said that FPI had passed the attitude of community organizations that were supposed to be reassuring. The dissolution of FPI did reap pros and cons, but a survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) showed that 59% of Indonesians approved of the decision.⁴⁵

The ban and dissolution of FPI dominated mass media channels and hegemonised the mainstream in the public. In the creation of news in the mass media, Foucault observed that language has a central role in determining the narrative and interpretation of an event. According to him, language is an instrument of power that influences the way we understand the world. In this context, Foucault emphasizes that language always creates and reinforces existing power structures.⁴⁶

Those who follow the FPI movement, provide responses through various communication channels and social media platforms. As mentioned earlier, the dissolution of FPI has given rise to varied responses, both pros and cons. Language is a fundamental element in the mass media news production process. At various stages of production, language plays an important role in information gathering, news writing and news presentation. Foucault mentioned that "language" has an impact on the reality that occurs, loading in the mass media is a construct to organize a

Usai Pembubaran FPI, Mahfud MD: MAsyarakat Senang Hidup Lebih Nyaman
<https://www.suara.com/news/2021/12/26/120009/usai-pembubaran-fpi-mahfud-md-masyarakat-senang-hidup-lebih-nyaman>, diakses, 06-Agustus 2023

Waduh...Setelah Pembubaran FPI, Mahfud MD Blak-Blakan: Masyarakat Senang, Hidup Terasa Nyaman
<https://wartaekonomi.co.id/read382876/waduh-setelah-pembubaran-fpi-mahfud-md-blak-blakan-masyarakat-senang-hidup-terasa-nyaman>, diakses 06-Agustus 2023

Mahfud Klaim Masyarakat Senang Setelah FPI Dibubarkan
<https://www.republika.co.id/berita/r4pwab354/mahfud-klaim-masyarakat-senang-setelah-fpi-dibubarkan>, diakses 06-Agustus-2023.

⁴⁴ Ratu, *Analisis Wacana Seksualitas Di Dalam Film All You Need Is Love-Meine Schwiegertochter Ist Ein Mann*.

⁴⁵ SMRC melakukan riset secara tatap muka dengan tingkat margin erornya sekitar 3,07 persen, sementara 28 februari sampai 5 maret 2021 ditemukan 71 persen dari seluruh total responden yang mengetahui FPI, dan 77 persen mengetahui jika FPI sudah dibubarkan oleh Pemerintah, lihat selengkapnya di Survei SMRC: 59 Persen Warga Setuju Pembubaran FPI: <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/survei-smrc-59-persen-warga-setuju-pembubaran-fpi/5842666.html>, diakses pada 11 Juni 2023

⁴⁶ Ratu, *Analisis Wacana Seksualitas Di Dalam Film All You Need Is Love-Meine Schwiegertochter Ist Ein Mann*.



reality into a discourse and information.⁴⁷ Thus, language is the power to create an informative narrative. Language has become a justification in discourse so that it can dominate others.

Social media is buzzing with the construction of news about the dissolution of FPI through the mass media that produces a narrative of the Government's discourse through a SKB. The policies of the six Ministers seem to be in direct contact with the public through the mass media. The mass media is a tool to ensure that the discourse built by the Government reaches the public and becomes information. At the same time, the Government also conveyed information to the public on the dissolution of FPI based on data and facts that have occurred in recent years. Therefore, public trends are organized in the structure of opinions, analyses, opinions whose presence according to Foucault is very inherent in social reality.⁴⁸

2. Discourse Production Based on Authority and Power of Knowledge: The Defeat of Extremism in the Dissolution of FPI

Power relations can influence and impact the people around them and their existence becomes dominant of every social reality. While according to Foucault a power in practice is not always interrogative and repressive, everything is based on the social conditions of society. The role of the ulama and the government regime is a manifestation of the spread of power relations.⁴⁹ Based on the observations and analysis of moderate scholars, FPI is the embodiment of an intolerant and violence-based community organization that is not in line with the principles of Pancasila.⁵⁰ According to Tata Sukayat, the FPI organization applied radical patterns and military styles in its movements.⁵¹

FPI builds power relations not only through da'wah on the pulpit, but also manifests in the practice of jihad, such as *sweeping*, demonstrations, and eradicating disobedience practices. As mentioned earlier, when in the momentum of the 212 reunion, FPI leader Habib Muhammad Habib Rizieq Shihab ignited the spirit of the implementation of *Islamic Sharia*.⁵² Therefore, the

⁴⁷ Indah Suryawati dan Jamalluail, "Analisis Wacana Kritis Keputusan Pembubaran Front Pembela Islam Di Kompas.Com," *Jurnal Komunikatif* Vol. 10, No. 1 (2021), 42.

⁴⁸ Ratu, *Analisis Wacana Seksualitas Di Dalam Film All You Need Is Love-Meine Schwiegertochter Ist Ein Mann*.

⁴⁹ Suryawati and Jamalullail, "Analisis Wacana Kritis Keputusan Pembubaran Front Pembela Islam Di Kompas.Com."

⁵⁰ "Nu Tolak Tegas Gerakan HTI dan FPI, bisa dilihat di <https://www.nu.or.id/nasional/nu-tolak-tegas-gerakan-hti-dan-fpi> NniTy, diakses pada 07-agustus-2023.

⁵¹ Tata Sukayat, "Radikalisme Islam Atas Nama Dakwah Hisbah Front Pembela Islam," *Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies* 12, no. 1, 2018, 4.

⁵² Dilansir di <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20171202080637-20-259615/rizieq-dorong-konsep-nkri-bersyariah-di-reuni-alumni-212>, diakses pada 07-Agustus-2023



existence of FPI in implementing its vision and mission can threaten religious harmony. So that the Government has full responsibility to maintain religious harmony from the threat of transnationalism ideology. Based on the data that has been mentioned, finally FPI was designated as a prohibited organization and administratively dissolved on behalf of the Government.

In order for every decision of power in the dissolution of FPI to be realized, the government represented by the decision of six ministers collects the facts and then observes and analyzes the FPI's space for movement by producing discourse and knowledge, and giving birth to a decision. According to Foucault, this decision is the practice of power through the production of social discourse,⁵³ by using the sharpness of knowledge and producing discourse for the sake of power and national sovereignty.

The SKB is the product of the practice of power, discourse, language and knowledge analysis, therefore based on a series of FPI track records, through the government's decision to define FPI as an extremism organization, an organization that prioritizes violence over dialogue in settlement on the ground and makes religion reduced and referred to justify FPI's actions. The dissolution is also based on religious developments in Indonesia that prioritize tolerance and clarity of thought known as Islamic moderation. This understanding is widely known and spread by moderate Indonesian ulemas, such as NU and Muhammadiyah.⁵⁴ This concept is the only concept that underlies the way of thinking on the basis of common interests and maintaining harmony and religious issues so as not to be dragged into the ideas of violence in the name of religion.

The dissolution of FPI is based on the production of discourse through the concept of Islamic moderation, which has long been familiar with the social conditions of Indonesian society. NU and Muhammadiyah along with other moderate groups, really bring Islam to the area of social reality, while FPI does not prioritize the social issues of Indonesian society which have long been realized as a heterogeneous social reality, diverse ethnicities, cultures, religious understandings but one ideology, namely the ideology of Pancasila. Finally, it is the social reality that cannot accept the presence of FPI and the government regime to build social reality by producing discourses on moderate issues.

⁵³ Suryawati and Jamalullail, "Analisis Wacana Kritis Keputusan Pembubaran Front Pembela Islam Di Kompas.Com."

⁵⁴ Tim Redaksi, "Moderasi Gerakan Islam," *Jurnal Penelitian Dan Kajian Keagamaan: Dialog*, Vol. 71, no. 1, 2018. IV.



Conclusion

In this context, "Islam" is again perceived through various issues and social realities, giving rise to a concept of the theology of the ummah in religion and state. Islam in Indonesia is interpreted based on beliefs, ranging from moderate to extreme beliefs. These two concepts were formulated to make Islam a religious symbol. For moderate groups, Islam is perceived as a core part of building civilization by prioritizing tolerance, clarity of thought, avoiding confusion in action and delving into the text, especially in the state.

Meanwhile, for hardline groups (read: extreme) interpret Islam as a form of internal indoctrination to build civilization, so that the practice of jihad is very unconcerned with minority groups (read: different religions, different understandings). FPI is one of the many Islamic groups that appear with religious ideological indoctrination that is full of vertical and horizontal conflicts based on religion. FPI proclaims *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* in every movement space of Indonesian society, which causes FPI to be very intolerant of other groups with different religious beliefs. Since its establishment, FPI has played an important role in influencing society and competing with the moderate Islamic tradition in Indonesia. They moved significantly to mobilize the Indonesian public to understand the FPI identity movement whose existence triggered public attention. In its dissolution, there is a significant role of power relations, starting from the government and ulama as well as from the community who are affected and victims of the actions of FPI.

Finally, the role of Indonesian ulemas with their moderation must be more careful and detailed in making the public the mainstream to build a space for religious movement, so that the movement of community organizations that tend to be "intolerant" always does not get opportunities or momentum. This research contributes to the study of Islamic culture and tradition by presenting a concentration of literacy studies studies that focuses on the issue of Islamic populism and the relationship between ulema and the government in placing the identity of community organizations. Including FPI which as a consequence of the public uproar in the last ten years. This issue is indeed not a new phenomenon in the discourse of Islamic studies, but it is still interesting to be researched and studied in order to add academic novelty in preserving scholarly traditions in the field of Islamic culture.



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